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Abstract—Following the trend of data trading and data pub-
lishing, many online social networks have enabled potentially
sensitive data to be exchanged or shared on the web. As a result,
users’ privacy could be exposed to malicious third parties since
they are extremely vulnerable to de-anonymization attacks, i.e.,
the attacker links the anonymous nodes in the social network
to their real identities with the help of background knowledge.
Previous work in social network de-anonymization mostly focuses
on designing accurate and efficient de-anonymization methods.
We study this topic from a different perspective and attempt to
investigate the intrinsic relation between the attacker’s knowledge
and the expected de-anonymization gain. One common intu-
ition is that the more auxiliary information the attacker has,
the more accurate de-anonymization becomes. However, their
relation is much more sophisticated than that. To simplify the
problem, we attempt to quantify background knowledge and de-
anonymization gain under several assumptions. Our theoretical
analysis and simulations on synthetic and real network data
show that more background knowledge may not necessarily lead
to more de-anonymization gain in certain cases. Though our
analysis is based on a few assumptions, the findings still leave
intriguing implications for the attacker to make better use of
the background knowledge when performing de-anonymization,
and for the data owners to better measure the privacy risk when
releasing their data to third parties.
Index Terms—Social network, de-anonymization, background
knowledge, adversarial knowledge, quantification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays we are able to collect and analyze data from var-
ious social networking sites like Facebook and Weibo, which
may contain sensitive information about individuals. Typical
social network data is stored in the form of graphs/networks,
with nodes representing users and edges representing relations
between uses. As social network analysis has great poten-
tial in many domains like business intelligence and social
science, more and more open platforms have emerged to
enable social network data to be exchanged on the web [1]–
[3]. However, users’ privacy could be exposed to malicious
attackers. Although users’ IDs are usually removed before
the data publishing, the attacker still can link the nodes in
the graph to their identities in real life by utilizing auxiliary
information (a.k.a. background/adversarial knowledge), which
is known as the de-anonymization attack [4], [5].
Social network de-anonymization has recently attracted
wide attention from the social network research community.
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Most of prior work focuses on designing graph mapping
techniques to de-anonymize the entire network [4]–[7]. Their
approaches are usually comprised of two phases: landmark
identification and mapping propagation. In addition, some
researchers concentrated on de-anonymizing a small group of
users, like ego networks, and proposed anonymization methods
to defend against such attacks [8]–[12]. It has been shown
that most existing network data are de-anonymizable partially
or even completely, and still no existing countermeasures can
effectively prevent such attacks [6].
This paper provides a different perspective on social net-
work de-anonymization. Our goal is to discover the internal
relation between the attacker’s background knowledge and her
de-anonymization gain (i.e. the amount of user identity loss).
To this end, we are facing three major challenges. Firstly, it
is extremely hard to quantify the de-anonymization gain of an
attacker without actually performing a real de-anonymization
attack. To study the influence of background knowledge on the
de-anonymization gain, we must consider various scenarios
to make the results as general as possible. However, it is
impossible to actually perform all the possible real attacks
to count the users de-anonymized in all these cases. Thus we
must estimate the expected de-anonymization gain in a general
way. Given an imaginary attacker with a certain amount of
background knowledge, it is still too complicated to estimate
how many users would be de-anonymized, which depends on
what type of knowledge the attacker has and how she per-
forms de-anonymization. All these obscure factors contribute
to the difficulty of the quantification of de-anonymization
gain. Secondly, it is very challenging to quantify adversarial
knowledge under a unified framework due to its large diversity.
An attacker’s background knowledge may include a variety
of profiles (like gender, age, location) and topological infor-
mation such as node degrees (friend numbers), 1-hop neigh-
borhood (ego network) and communities (interest groups).
Lastly, the attacker capability is unpredictable. For example,
an attacker may gather auxiliary information from multiple
sources, which may not be fully revealed to the public. She
may design various delicate techniques to de-anonymize the
social network and her computation ability is also unknown
to us. To overcome these challenges, we will have to make
several assumptions to simplify the problem.
In this paper, we model the de-anonymization attack
on the basis of subgraph matching/isomorphism (but de-
anonymization is much more complex than it). The released
social network dataset is referred to as the published graph,
which is anonymous to the attacker. The attacker’s background
knowledge can also be modeled as a graph (referred to as
the query graph), in which she usually knows the users’
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2identifications. The attacker aims to link the users in the query
to the corresponding nodes in the published graph so as to
acquire their private information. She maps users in the query
graph to nodes in the published graph to find subgraphs that
match the query. The definition of the verb “match” depends
on the properties of background knowledge (Section III).
Previous works have proposed many approximation algorithms
for efficiently searching for the subgraph(s) that match the
query [4]–[6], so we assume the attacker is powerful enough
to find all the possible subgraphs that match her background
knowledge. Since any of these subgraphs matches her back-
ground knowledge, she would be unable to tell them apart and
any of them is treated as a possible candidate of the real match
of the query. Now the difficulty of de-anonymization lies in
the indistinguishability of the matched subgraphs. The fewer
matched subgraphs are found, the easier it is to pinpoint the
real match and the more information is gained by the attacker.
We will formally define de-anonymization gain in Section II-C
based on this intuition. Meanwhile, we quantify the attacker’s
background knowledge from two aspects: by quantity (e.g.
node number of the query graph) and by quality (e.g. the extent
of “particularity” of nodes, edges and attributes) (Section III).
On top of that we will study the influence of background
knowledge on de-anonymization gain from a fundamental
view.
We present a detailed theoretical analysis for G(n, p) random
graphs [13] and power-law graphs [14] (Sections IV and
V), and conduct rich simulations for both synthetic data and
real network datasets (Section VI). The results show that in
some settings, the attacker’s de-anonymization gain is mono-
tone increasing with the amount of background knowledge
as expected by our intuition. However, it is not monotone
increasing in other cases. For example, it could first decrease
for a while, then go up after the attacker’s knowledge reaches
a threshold (valley point), and finally gets to the highest
(vanish point) (further explained in Sections IV and V). To
clarify, we made several assumptions to simplify the problem
because it is extremely challenging to directly analyze it.
Our findings are based on these assumptions so they only
apply to certain situations. Yet the transition phenomenon
we found in the relation between background knowledge and
de-anonymization gain still leaves interesting implications for
both data publishers and attackers (Section VI-C).
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We build a taxonomy of background knowledge in Sec-
tion III and comprehensively analyze the impacts of
different types of background knowledge on the process
and the result of de-anonymization.
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first at-
tempt to quantitatively study the influence of background
knowledge on de-anonymization gain. We present our
definition of de-anonymization gain and quantification
of background knowledge and then present a detailed
theoretical analysis of their relation. It is revealed that
more adversarial knowledge does not always result in
more de-anonymization gain in certain cases. We further
explain the reasons and the meaning of the critical points
in their relation curve.
• We present rich simulations on both synthetic and
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Fig. 1: Subgraph matching: I is a randomly picked candidate
of Q, i.e., an induced subgraph of G yielded by randomly
choosing nQ nodes in G plus a mapping that maps them with
nodes in Q. Whether Q, I match is up to how we define match.
real network data sets even though we are facing the
challenge of approximating the NP-complete subgraph
matching problem. The experiment displays different
kinds of relation between background knowledge and de-
anonymization gain, which validates our claim in one
sense.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We first introduce subgraph matching, the essence of social
network de-anonymization attack, and then define the de-
anonymization attack on top of that. We will also briefly
introduce two popular graph models: G(n, p) random graphs
and power-law graphs, which are to be used to model the
social network.
A. Subgraph Matching
Subgraph matching (a.k.a. subgraph isomorphism) is a
fundamental computational problem on graphs. It aims to find
a subgraph in a graph G that is isomorphic to another (usu-
ally smaller) graph Q. We introduce the following important
concepts that are critical to our model and analysis.
Definition 1 (Subgraph): Given a graph G(V, E), a subgraph
Gs(Vs, Es) is a graph such that Vs ⊆ V and Es ⊆ E .
Definition 2 (Induced Subgraph): Given a graph G(V, E),
an induced subgraph I(VI, EI ) is a graph s.t. VI ⊆ V , and for
any u, v ∈ VI with an edge in E , the edge exists in EI .
Definition 3 (Subgraph Matching): Given a graph G(V, E)
and a query graph Q = (VQ, EQ), subgraph matching is the
problem of finding a subset Vs ⊆ V s.t. there is a bijective
mapping f : Vq → Vs that satisfies
∀e(u, v) ∈ EQ, e( f (u), f (v)) ∈ E .
The problem has been proved to be NP-complete [15]. Fig. 1
shows an example of subgraph matching. The problem sub-
graph counting is more related to this paper but even harder to
solve, which requires counting the number of (or enumerating)
matches (defined as follows) of Q in G.
Definition 4 (Match): Given G and Q, a match is a subset
Vs ⊆ V together with a bijective mapping f : VQ → Vs that
satisfies
∀e(u, v) ∈ EQ, e( f (u), f (v)) ∈ E .
We denote the number of matches obtained from querying G
with Q as M(G,Q) (MQ for short) and the set of matches as
MQ.
3In this paper, we will analyze de-anonymization on the basis
of subgraph matching. However, we study “matching” in a
broad sense since many real factors need to be taken into
consideration, for example, the matching of nodal attributes,
the induced and non-induced subgraph matching, exact and
noisy matching, and probabilistic matching.
B. Social Network De-anonymization
Social network de-anonymization [4], [5] refers to the
process of re-identifying anonymous nodes in a released
social network. The attacker usually possesses rich back-
ground knowledge, e.g. another social network data set, so
de-anonymization is a problem of mapping users in the
background knowledge to nodes in the network. We refer to
the released social network as the published graph G, and
model the background knowledge as a query graph Q. Both
G,Q could contain rich nodal attributes. De-anonymization is
similar to but much more than subgraph matching.
Definition 5 (De-Anonymization): Given a published graph
G, an attacker’s de-anonymization on G refers to an algorithm
which, on inputs G and Q, identifies a subset of nodes VI ⊆ V
and a bijective mapping f : VQ → VI s.t. the subgraph I
induced in G by VI matches Q under f (denoted as I ' f Q,
or I ' Q for simplicity). Herein, the verb “match” can be
defined in terms of structure/attribute similarity from multiple
perspectives, which will be detailed in Section III. Each pair
of VI and the corresponding f is referred to as a match of
VQ. There could be multiple matches (denote match number
as MQ) in G, but only one real match of Q exists whose nodes
exactly correspond to real-life users in Q.
To simplify, we assume Q is connected (if not, the problem
equals de-anonymizing multiple connected query graphs) and
that the attacker de-anonymizes Q as a whole. The two
major challenges of de-anonymization attack are finding all
the subgraph matches (MQ) of a given query Q and dis-
tinguishing the candidate matches. Since subgraph matching
is NP-complete, researchers have been working on designing
various approximation algorithms to overcome it, such as using
landmark identification techniques to prune the search space
[4]–[6]. So it is reasonable to assume this challenge can be
overcome by a computationally powerful attacker, that is, she
can find all the subgraphs of G that match her background
knowledge Q by some means. Thus, the real difficulty of de-
anonymization lies in the indistinguishability of these matches
since they all accord with Q, which introduces our definition
of de-anonymization gain as below.
C. De-Anonymization Gain
To quantify de-anonymization, we have to take the back-
ground knowledge Q into account because it determines how
much user identity information the attacker will recover. As
mentioned above, the attacker has used up all of her knowledge
to find the matches MQ and every match exactly conforms
to the attacker’s background knowledge. Thus, the attacker is
unable to distinguish them, so she randomly picks a match
I ∈ MQ and treats it as the real correspond of Q. The
probability of picking the real match is 1/MQ. Therefore, the
quantity of matches reflects the de-anonymization gain in one
G(V, E) Published graph
Q(VQ, EQ) Query graph
G(n, p) A random graph model with size n and edge
probability p
nQ Size (vertex number) of Q
mQ Edge number of Q
β Exponent of the power-law graph model
MQ Short for M(G,Q), the number of matches
obtained from querying G with Q
I Any candidate of Q, i.e., an induced subgraph
of G yielded by choosing nQ nodes in G, plus
a mapping that maps them with nodes in Q
DAG(Q) Infimum of de-anonymization gain given query
Q
Q ' I Q and I are matched
Q 'e I Q and I are matched in edges
Q 'a I Q and I are matched in node attributes
pA Probability of two nodes sharing all the at-
tribute
p(ei j ) The attacker’s confidence on the edge ei j con-
necting nodes i, j
TABLE I: Frequently used symbols
sense, which is similar to k-anonymity [16]. The more matches
are yielded by querying G with Q, the less possible it is that
user identities are recovered by the attacker. Let the number of
nodes in G,Q be n, nQ respectively. When the attacker picks
the real match, nQ users are de-anonymized. If she picks a
wrong match, none (in the worst case) or part of the nQ users
are de-anonymized. We cannot give a formula of the expected
number of de-anonymized users but we know its infimum (i.e.
worst case) is nQ/MQ. We define de-anonymization gain as
the expected fraction of de-anonymized users in the published
graph G. The infimum of de-anonymization gain is calculated
as follows.
DAG(Q) = nQ
MQn
. (1)
Obviously DAG(Q) ∈ (0, 1]. When MQ = 0, the attacker could
not find any match so we define DAG(Q) = 0. In the rest of
this paper, when we mention de-anonymization gain we refer
to its infimum.
D. Graph Models
1) G(n, p) Random Graph Model: There are two closely
related variants of the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) model, but we focus
on the G(n, p) model only. In the G(n, p) model, a graph is con-
structed by connecting nodes randomly. Each edge is included
in the graph with probability p independent from every other
edge. As p increases from 0 to 1, the graphs become denser
with more edges. Such random graphs are fundamental and
useful for modeling problems in many applications. However,
a random graph in G(n, p) has the same expected degree at
every node and therefore does not capture some of the main
behaviors of numerous graphs developed in the real world.
2) Power-Law Graph Model: A graph is said to have
power-law property if its degree sequences satisfy power-
law distribution. Namely, the fraction of nodes with degree
d is proportional to d−β for some constant β. Many real
world networks, at least asymptotically, conform to the power-
law model for example, citation networks [17] and social
networks [18]. Networks with power-law degree distributions
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Fig. 2: A taxonomy of background knowledge Q
are sometimes referred to as scale-free networks. Typically,
the parameter β for real world power-law networks is in the
range 2 < β < 3 [19]. Power-law graphs can be generated
with different methods, such as the preferential attachment
mechanism (e.g. Baraba´si-Albert model [20]).
III. ATTACKER’S BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
This section discusses about background knowledge of the
attacker in terms of taxonomy and quantification, which covers
most cases in real de-anonymization scenarios.
A. A Taxonomy of Background Knowledge
The attacker’ background knowledge in the de-
anonymization helps her to re-identify the nodes in
the published graph. Such knowledge may include the
relationship between individuals (edges) and their attributes
(nodal attributes). In this paper, background knowledge is
represented with a query graph Q. Different attackers may
possess different types of background knowledge as their
capabilities of information gathering and procession may vary.
Such different knowledge has different impacts on the process
of de-anonymization. Specifically, it influences how the
attacker defines “match”. As an example depicted in Fig. 1,
given a candidate I of Q, that is, an induced subgraph yielded
by randomly picking nQ nodes from G and mapping them to
the nodes in Q, the attacker determines if I is a match of Q on
the basis of her beliefs in her knowledge Q. Here we present
a detailed taxonomy of the overall properties of background
knowledge1, which captures most, if not all, types of possible
de-anonymization attacks with background knowledge in
reality. We categorize the properties (the attacker’s belief)
of Q in four dimensions: structural correctness, structural
completeness, nodal attributes, and attacker’s confidence. The
former two lay emphasis on examining the occurrence of
users’ connections of Q in G. An overview of the taxonomy
is depicted in Fig. 2 and detailed explanations are as follows.
Structural correctness: The structural information in Q,
i.e. edges, could be either exact or noisy. Exact means that
the attacker believes every edge ei j in Q is correct and
indispensable; in other words, she firmly believes that users
represented by i and j are indeed connected in real life.
Thus, a given subgraph of G is considered to be a match
of Q only if it contains all the edges in Q. In a more
practical setting, structural information is often noisy. The
data publishers usually add noise/perturbation to the datasets
1Note that we do not classify background knowledge in terms of its sources
or classes, which has been discussed in [21] and has little impact on de-
anonymization.
before they are published in order to increase the difficulty
of de-anonymization. Such perturbation techniques include
generalization, suppression, swapping and so on. Besides,
noise could be brought to Q because of inaccurate information
gathering. In such circumstances, the attacker would assume
her knowledge about edges is noisy. When comparing their
edges to determine whether a subgraph I matches Q, the
attacker would tolerate a few missing or extra edges in Q.
Structural completeness: The attacker’s knowledge of struc-
tural information can be either partial or complete. Partial
knowledge is caused by incomplete information gathering,
which means incomplete background knowledge. There might
be a few edges missing in Q that in fact exist in G. In this
case, the attacker performs non-induced subgraph matching as
missing edges in Q are allowed. Yet in a more ideal scenario,
the attacker may think her knowledge of edges is complete
and then perform induced subgraph matching.
Nodal attributes: The query graph Q might contain users’
attributes (attribute included) or not (attribute ignored). Some-
times attackers de-anonymize graph data with only structural
information as prior knowledge, such as [6], [7]. In other cases,
they also have the possession of users’ profiles and utilize them
in comparing users and the candidate nodes [11], [22]. The
attribute included case can be further split according to the
correctness of the attacker’s knowledge about attributes: the
attacker 1) performs exact matching on attributes if they are
exactly correct; or 2) allows a few errors if they are assumed
to be almost correct; or 3) matches the attributes of users and
their candidates in an approximate way, e.g., the ages of 32
and 34 might be treated as matched.
Attacker’s confidence: Most of previous works assume the
attacker is very sure about her knowledge of both edges and
attributes, which is referred to as deterministic knowledge.
More practically, the attacker’s knowledge could be proba-
bilistic since she could be uncertain about the information
gathered. Details will be presented in Section IV-C.
B. Background Knowledge Quantification
Prior to the analysis of the influence of background knowl-
edge on de-anonymization gain, we first present the quantifi-
cation of background knowledge in two aspects.
By quantity: The amount of background knowledge can
simply be measured by its scalar quantity, such as node
number, edge number, and attribute number. We choose node
number nQ as the metric for our theoretical analysis.
By quality: The particularity of background knowledge
also determines the success rate of de-anonymization. Special
knowledge, such as the “outstanding” nodes (a.k.a. seeds),
edges, attributes, and patterns, can help the attacker greatly
filter the candidate matches. The more different the attacker’s
belief is from the global distribution, the more informative
and valuable the knowledge is. Thus, background knowledge
can be quantified by quality as well, e.g., the number of
nodes with high degrees, graph density, the number of special
structural patterns like cliques, the ratio of edges whose
probabilities are close to 1 or 0 if the attacker has probabilistic
knowledge, or the number of users with a particular attribute
whose distribution is very distinct from the global distribution
5(measured by Kullback-Leibler divergence). We will also use
the ratio of highly deterministic edges and graph density as
the metrics. Both of them inflect the quality of the attacker’s
background knowledge on the structural information.
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ON G(n, p) GRAPHS
Here we study the case where G follows G(n, p) random
graph model. For every type of background knowledge, we
present formulas to calculate the match number MQ, which
decides the de-anonymization gain DAG(Q) by Equation 1.
The formulas of MQ are derived from Theorem 1 below. We
will plot the relation between DAG(Q) and the amount of
background knowledge in the end of this section.
Theorem 1: Given a graph G ∈ G(n, p) and any query graph
Q whose node number is nQ and edge number is mQ, let I
be a randomly selected candidate of Q (Fig. 1), the expected
number of matches of Q in an ER random graph G(n, p) is
E(MQ) =
(
n
nQ
)
nQ! · Pr(Q ' I), (2)
where Q ' I means Q and I are matched. We will omit the
expectation symbol (E(·)) hereafter.
The proof is presented in Appendix A. Notice this theorem
does not make any assumption about Q. It can be any given
graph with arbitrary structure, for instance an ego network or
a 2-hop neighborhood graph.
As mentioned in Section III, different types of background
knowledge determine how match is defined. For the sake of
clarification, we first consider the case where Q is attribute-
ignored and deterministic, and then study more complex
scenarios on top of it.
A. Deterministic Knowledge with Attribute Ignored
Sometimes the attacker uses only structural information for
de-anonymization, such as [6], [7]. To decide if I is a match
of Q, we only need to check if their edges match, so Pr(Q '
I) = Pr(Q 'e I), where Q 'e I represents “match in edges”.
There are four basic situations to be discussed.
1) Exact & Partial Knowledge: At first, we consider the
situation where the attacker thinks that her knowledge is exact
but partial. Then I is a match if Q is a subgraph of I, i.e., every
edge in Q has a counterpart in I (the probability is p because
of the G(n, p) model). Redundant edges in I is acceptable and
not of interest, thus we refer to it as subset matching. In this
case, we have
Pr(Q 'e I) = pmQ,
MQ =
(
n
nQ
)
nQ! · pmQ . (3)
Note only node number and edge number of Q are involved
in this formula; its network structure can be arbitrary and has
no influence on the result.
2) Exact & Complete Knowledge: When the attacker thinks
her background knowledge is exact and complete, she would
perform exact matching over the edges of Q and I. In this
case, I is not considered as a match if it has any redundant or
missing edge. We have
Pr(Q 'e I) = pmQ (1 − p)m0−mQ,
MQ =
(
n
nQ
)
nQ! · pmQ (1 − p)m0−mQ, (4)
where m0 = nQ(nQ − 1)/2 is the edge number of a complete
graph with nQ nodes.
3) Noisy & Partial Knowledge: This is a relaxation of
the first case. We use δ(Q, I) to denote the number of extra
edges in Q that do not exist in I. Note this function δ is
not symmetric. The attacker performs matching, and I is still
considered to be a match of Q if δ(Q, I) ≤  (at most 
unmatched edges). Here  is the threshold of acceptable error
of the attacker’s knowledge in terms of edges. In this scenario,
Pr(Q 'e I) = Pr(δ(Q, I) ≤ ) =
∑
k≤
Pr(δ(Q, I) = k),
MQ =
(
n
nQ
)
nQ! ·
∑
k≤
(
mQ
k
)
· pmQ−k(1 − p)k . (5)
4) Noisy & Complete Knowledge: In this case, a match of
Q in G is “almost” an induced subgraph of G; there might
be a few missing or extra edges. To determine whether I is
a match, the requirement δ(Q, I) ≤ , δ(I,Q) ≤  has to be
satisfied. In this case, Pr(Q 'e I) = Pr(δ(Q, I) ≤ , δ(I,Q) ≤
) = ∑k,l≤ Pr(δ(Q, I) = k, δ(I,Q) = l). We can derive the
formula of MQ similarly.
B. Deterministic Knowledge with Attribute Included
In the real world, users in a social network have attributes
like gender, age and occupation. The attacker could also have
such information in her background knowledge in addition to
the relations between users. Accordingly, each node in G and
Q is attached with nA attributes, denoted as Ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ nA.
Now Q and I are considered to be a match only if both of
their edges and node attributes are considered as matched.
Pr(Q ' I) = Pr(Q 'e I)·Pr(Q 'a I). Likewise, 'a represents
“match in attributes”.
Each of the attributes has a domain, denoted as Ai, 0 ≤ i ≤
nA. Let PrAi (a) be the probability of a node being labeled as
a, for any a ∈ Ai . Then the expected probability of any two
nodes sharing attribute Ai is pAi =
∑
a∈Ai PrAi (a)PrAi (a).
(An continuous attribute can be binned into buckets and thus
converted to a discrete attribute.) The expected probability of
any two nodes sharing all the attributes is pA =
∏nA
i=0 pAi .
Thus, we have Pr(Q 'a I) = pnQA .
When the attacker has exact and partial background knowl-
edge on edges (it can be easily extended to other cases), and
exactly correct knowledge on attributes, the expected number
of matches she will obtain by querying G with Q is
MQ =
(
n
nQ
)
nQ! · pmQ pnQA . (6)
1) Almost Correct Knowledge on Attributes: Similar to
almost correct knowledge on edges, the attacker can have a
few inaccurate information (caused by imperfect information
gathering and data perturbation on G) about users’ attributes
(at most  pairs of nodes with mismatched attributes).
Pr(Q 'a I) =
∑
k≤
(
nQ
k
)
pnQ−k
A
(1 − pA)k . (7)
6“Almost correct” can also be interpreted in another way.
Two users are still considered to match in attributes if they
disagree in at most  out of nA attributes ( < nA). Then, pA
should be modified to
pA =
∑
S⊆A, |S | ≤
∏
Ai ∈S
(1 − pAi )
∏
Ai ∈A/S
pAi , (8)
where A is the set of all the attributes, and S is the set of
unmatched attributes.
2) Approximate Attribute Matching: Due to the noise added
by the publisher to graph G, a few attribute values in G
might be twisted. A node corresponding to a real life person
might have slightly different attribute values than those of the
person. For example, a person is 31 years old, but her age is
distorted to 30 in G. If the attacker is aware of the possible
discrepancies between her background knowledge and the
information presented by G, it is very likely she ignores minor
attribute discrepancies while performing subgraph matching
attack. To estimate the number of results yielded by subgraph
query under this circumstance, we need to redefine pAi .
pAi =
∑
a∈Ai
∑
b∈Ai
PrAi (a)PrAi (b)Pr(a ' b), (9)
where Pr(a ' b) represents the probability that a and b
approximately match. As an example for age, the probability
that 30 and 40 are an approximate match is 0, but the
probability of 30 and 32 can be set to 1. The probability
is conceptually different from similarity functions, but it can
be calculated using them such as cosine similarity, Dirac
delta function or exp(−x). We do not expand the formula of
Pr(a ' b) here because there can be different definitions for
different attributes.
C. Probabilistic Knowledge
In a more realistic setting, the attacker’s knowledge on
users’ relations and attributes could be probabilistic. Suppose
a probability p(ei j) is assigned to each edge ei j of the
query graph Q to represent the attacker’s confidence over
ei j . Now Q is a complete graph and edges that do not exist
is with zero confidence. In this case, there is no need to
distinguish exact or noisy knowledge. Q can be any one of
the 2m0 configurations generated from VQ. We can compare
each configuration (denoted as Qc) with I to calculate the
probabilistic that Q and I are matched.
Pr(Q 'e I)
=
∑
Qc
Pr(Qc |Q) · Pr(Qc 'e I)
=
∑
Qc
∏
ei j ∈E(Qc )
p(ei j)
∏
ei j<E(Qc )
(1 − p(ei j)) · Pr(Qc 'e I).
(10)
1) Probabilistic & Partial Knowledge: Due to the partial
knowledge assumption, we have Pr(Qc 'e I) = p |E(Qc ) | .
The computation cost of Pr(Q 'e I) is exponential. One
simplifying method is to assume p(ei j) = pe, ∀ei j ∈ EQ.
Following Equation 10, we can derive
Pr(Q 'e I)
=
∑
Qc
Pr(Qc |Q) · Pr(Qc 'e I)
=
m0∑
k=0
(
m0
k
)
· pke(1 − pe)m0−k · pk
=(1 − pe + ppe)m0 .
(11)
An alternative simplification is to sample from the 2m0 con-
figuration and then rescale the result.
2) Probabilistic & Complete Knowledge: When the at-
tacker believes her knowledge is complete, Pr(Qc 'e I) =
p |E(Qc ) |(1 − p)m0−|E(Qc ) | . When it is assumed all p(ei j) = pe,
we can derive
Pr(Q 'e I)
=
m0∑
k=0
(
m0
k
)
· pke(1 − pe)m0−k · pk(1 − p)m0−k
=(1 − p − pe + 2ppe)m0 .
(12)
A more realistic simplification is to assume that the attacker’s
confidence on edges of the complete graph Q has three levels:
high (p(ei j) = p1 say 0.9), low (p(ei j) = p0 say 0.1) and
medium (say p(ei j) = p for G(n, p)). For edges with medium
confidence, the attacker has no additional knowledge of them,
so she will overlook the checking of their occurrence in I.
Given p1, p0 and suppose the number of the three types of
edges are x1, x0, xm respectively (x1 + x0 + xm = m0), then
Pr(Q 'e I) = (pp1 + (1− p)(1− p1))x1 (pp0 + (1− p)(1− p0))x0 .
(13)
We can measure background knowledge by the ratio of highly
deterministic edges r = x1+x0m0 , which reflects the quality of the
knowledge. We will also plot the influence of r on DAG(Q).
3) Probabilistic Attributes: The attacker could also have
uncertain knowledge about users’ attributes. Suppose for each
nodal attribute in Q, there is a probability distribution pi over
the domain of the attribute reflecting the attacker’s belief. If
she has no additional knowledge about a person’s attribute
Ai , her belief is set to the original distribution in G, that is
PrAi . Then the probability of two nodes sharing attribute Ai is
pAi =
∑
a∈Ai PrAi (a)
∑
b∈Ai pi(b)Pr(a ' b), where Pr(a ' b)
represents the probability that a and b match.
D. Analytical Results
As aforementioned we have listed the formulas to calculate
MQ and thus DAG(Q). We study the impact of background
knowledge on the de-anonymization gain and plot it in Fig. 3-
6 for every case discussed above by varying all kinds of
parameters. Please see Table III for a complete list. The
parameters used in these plots are listed in Table II, and we set
a default value for each of them in order to control variables
when plotting each of their influence on the results. We have
tried all possible parameter values other than the default, and
the results are similar under most settings.
When the background knowledge is quantified by the
number of nodes nQ, in some settings more background
knowledge indeed results in more de-anonymization gain for
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Fig. 3: The impact of nQ on de-anonymization gain for exact & partial(Fig. a-c)/complete(Fig. d-f) knowledge on G(n, p)
graphs. Most curves have a transition phenomenon: with growing nQ, de-anonymization gain first descends to the valley then
rises to the maximum.
Parameter Meaning Default
n size of the published graph G 1000,000
p edge probability in G(n, p) for G 0.2
nQ size of query graph Q 50
pq graph density of Q 0.3
pA prob. of 2 nodes sharing attributes 0.001
pe attacker’s confidence on any edge 0.4
p1 attacker’s high confidence on edges 0.9
p0 attacker’s low confidence on edges 0.1
r ratio of highly deterministic edges 0.5
TABLE II: Parameters used in plotting and default settings.
We set a default value for each of them in order to control
variables when plotting each of their influence on the results.
All possible parameter values are tried in addition to the
default values.
the attacker, which conforms to our intuition. For instance,
as shown in Fig. 4(b), 4(f)), when the knowledge is noisy
& partial (or complete) and pq = 0.5 ∼ 0.8, DAG(Q) is
monotone increasing with respect to nQ. When the background
knowledge is quantified by the ratio of highly deterministic
edges r , DAG(Q) is also monotone increasing with respect to
r , as indicated by Fig. 6(d-f). We see that in some cases, more
adversarial knowledge implies higher risk of user identities
being compromised.
However, this is not necessarily the case. Some of the curves
show a counter-intuitive relation between DAG(Q) and nQ,
e.g. most curves in Fig. 3. They have a transition phenomenon:
with growing nQ, DAG(Q) first decreases until reaching a
valley and then increases to the highest. There are two critical
points, valley point and vanish point, referring to the value of
nQ where DAG(Q) reaches the valley and the highest point
respectively. When nQ is greater than the vanish point, we
get the estimated number of matches MQ < 1 according to
the formulas. Such a result does not make sense so we do
not plot it on the curves. In real-world attacks, when the
background knowledge reaches the vanish point, the attacker
finds the only one match and thus users are de-anonymized
successfully. Furthermore, the curves reveal that the position of
the critical points are decided by multiple parameters including
p, pq, pA, r .
The occurrence of transition phenomenon can be explain
by Theorem 1. The match number MQ which determines de-
anonymization gain is influenced by two factors, the size of
mapping space
( n
nQ
)
nQ! and the matching probability Pr(Q '
I). The mapping space increases with growing nQ owing to
an increasing number of node permutations. The matching
probability decreases with respect to nQ as a randomly selected
candidate needs to meet more and more requirements to be a
match of Q. The two factors have the opposite effects on MQ
so there is a possibility that a transition phenomenon occurs.
We also plotted (though not presented here) the relation
between de-anonymization gain and pq with fixed nQ. The re-
sults conforms to the intuition, i.e. a denser Q would contribute
to a more successful de-anonymization attack. Therefore, we
reach the conclusion that more knowledge does imply more
de-anonymization gain in some settings, but that might not
always be the case.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ON POWER-LAW GRAPHS
In this section, we study the relation of de-anonymization
gain and background knowledge when G conforms to the
power-law model. A power-law graph can be generated with a
given degree sequence that has a power-law distribution [14].
Specifically, n(d) = αd−β , where n(d) represents the number
of nodes with degree d ∈ N+, α, β are predefined parameters,
and β > 2. It is tricky to give a formula of MQ, but we derive a
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Fig. 4: The impact of nQ on de-anonymization gain for noisy & partial(Fig. a-d)/complete(Fig. e-h) knowledge on G(n, p).
Query size nQ
0 20 40 60 80
D
A
G
(Q
)
10-80
10-60
10-40
10-20
100
p=0.6
p=0.4
p=0.2
p=0.02
p=0.002
p=0.0002
(a) Varying p
Query size nQ
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
D
A
G
(Q
)
10-100
10-50
100
pA=0.1
pA=0.01
pA=0.001
pA=0.0001
pA=0.00001
(b) Varying pA
Query size nQ
0 20 40 60 80
D
A
G
(Q
)
10-80
10-60
10-40
10-20
100
p
e
=0.2
p
e
=0.3
p
e
=0.4
p
e
=0.5
p
e
=0.6
p
e
=0.7
p
e
=0.8
(c) Varying pe
Fig. 5: The impact of nQ on de-anonymization gain for edges with probabilistic & partial knowledge on G(n, p).
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Fig. 6: The impact of nQ (Fig. a-c) and r (Fig. d-f) on de-anonymization gain for probabilistic edges & complete knowledge
on G(n, p).
9Fig. Correctness Completeness Attributes Confidence
3(a-c) exact partial included deterministic
3(d-f) exact complete included deterministic
4(a-d) noisy partial included deterministic
4(e-h) noisy complete included deterministic
5 N/A partial included probabilistic
6 N/A complete included probabilistic
TABLE III: Figures and background knowledge types for
G(n, p) graphs.
lower bound for it for the case of exact and partial knowledge
with attribute ignored.
Theorem 2: MQ ≥
( n
nQ
)
nQ!( β−1n(β−2) )mQ .
The proof is given in Appendix B. We can use this result to
estimate the upper bound of DAG(Q).
Analytical Results: We set pq = 0.05 as default and set
other parameters as given in Table II. As shown in Fig. 7, in
some settings there is a transition phenomenon in the relation
between the upper bound of DAG(Q) and nQ for power-law
graphs, but in other settings (e.g. pq = 0.3 ∼ 0.5) there is no
transition phenomenon (Fig. 7(b)).
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Fig. 7: The impact of nQ on the privacy lower bound for the
exact & partial knowledge on power-law graphs
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present our simulations on both syn-
thetic data and real network datasets. We would explain the
relation observed between background knowledge and de-
anonymization gain based on the results obtained.
A. Methodology
Due to the hardness of subgraph matching and subgraph
counting, many previous works focus on designing approx-
imation algorithms e.g. [23]–[25]. The biggest challenge in
the experiment is to estimate the match number MQ, which
relies on the NP-complete subgraph counting problem. We
DBLP Arxiv Facebook YouTube LiveJournal
n 0.3M 23K 4K 1.1M 4M
m 1M 93K 88K 3M 34.7M
TABLE IV: Real collaboration/online social network datasets
implement a state-of-the-art approximate algorithm in [25],
which still has exponential time and space complexity. Al-
though it only applies to undirected graphs and query graphs
with treewidth no more than 2, it is so far the work that has
the least restricts about the size and structure of queries. On
the contrary, other approximation algorithms such as [23] are
usually limited to very small-sized query graphs (less than 10
nodes for example), or query graphs with a specific structure
like triangle, circle or tree.
Datasets: We verify our claims on both synthetic data and
real network data. For synthetic data, we generate random
power-law graphs with n = 100K and different β. Experiment
of querying on G(n, p) graphs is not presented here for space
limit (it has been analyzed and plotted in Section IV-D). For
real datasets, we use both online social networks (Facebook,
YouTube, LiveJournal) and collaboration networks (DBLP,
Arxiv Cond-Mat) (see Table IV for statistics). They have
power-law like degree distribution as shown in Fig 8(d).
The experiment on each dataset consists of 4 steps: 1)
preprocess the original graph G, 2) generate query graphs Q by
varying nQ and mQ respectively, 3) query G with Q, calculate
MQ and DAG(Q), and 4) plot the relation between DAG(Q)
and nQ or graph density pq (= 2mQ/nQ(nQ − 1)).
In the second step above, query graphs are generated by
randomly extracting ego networks from G. De-anonymizing
ego networks is also commonly researched in the literature
[10], [11]. We distinguish ego networks as star and non-stars
as they have different influence on the matching results. Star
queries usually have large quantities of matches in G due to
their considerable automorphisms.
B. Experimental Results and Analysis
The majority of ego networks we sampled are stars (espe-
cially for power-law graphs, the ratio is 60 ∼ 90%). The results
for star queries are displayed in Fig. 8(a-c), which reveals that
de-anonymizing Q of greater size is more difficult. This is
because stars of larger size have more automorphisms which
results in more matches found in G. The curves in the figure
end when nQ exceeds the highest degree. For non-star queries,
the results are presented as follows.
Knowledge quantified by nQ (quantity): The relation be-
tween de-anonymization gain and nQ for synthetic data is
plotted in Fig. 9(a). It reveals that DAG(Q) first descends and
then fluctuates or picks up a bit when nQ grows. We did not
obtain the experiment data for nQ > 18 due to its excessive
demand for memory. Though we have not clearly observe
the transition phenomenon yet, we can at least learn from
this figure that more background knowledge does not always
induce more de-anonymization gain in some cases. Similar
phenomena are also found for real networks, as depicted by
Fig. 9(b). The curves are not smooth due to two possible
reasons: 1) real networks do not exactly follow the power-law
model and 2) the approximate subgraph counting algorithm
we utilize does not output exact match numbers.
10
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 4 X H U \  V L ] H nQ
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
lo
g
10
D
A
G
G   * n= 1000000, p  Q   6 W D U nQ 
p= 0. 0001
p= 0. 0002
p= 0. 0003
(a) G(n, p) graphs
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 4 X H U \  V L ] H nQ
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
lo
g
10
D
A
G
G   3 R Z H U B O D Z n= 1000000, β  Q   6 W D U nQ 
β= 2. 1
β= 2. 5
β= 2. 9
(b) Power-law graphs
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 4 X H U \  V L ] H nQ
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
lo
g
10
D
A
G
G   5 H D O  Q H W Z R U N V Q   6 W D U nQ 
 $ U [ L Y  & R Q G 0 D W
 < R X 7 X E H
 / L Y H - R X U Q D O
 ' % / 3
 ) D F H E R R N
(c) Real networks
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Degree  d
0
200
400
600
800
1000
N
od
e 
nu
m
be
r n
(d
)
Real networks degree distributions
Arxiv-CondMat
YouTube
LiveJournal
DBLP
Facebook
(d) Degree distribution
Fig. 8: The impact of nQ on DAG(Q) for star queries on synthetic/real networks (Fig. a-c), and degree distribution of
real networks (Fig. d): The greater nQ is, the smaller DAG(Q) is.
Knowledge quantified by pq (quality): Fig. 9(c) and 9(d)
display the relation between DAG(Q) and pq . It is shown
that sometimes DAG(Q) first increases then slowly decreases
again with growing pq . At first, the denser Q is, the more
“special” it is, so fewer matches are found and it is easier
to pinpoint each user. However, when pq reaches a threshold,
Q has more automorphisms when pq is greater, e.g., Q has
the most number of automorphisms when it is a clique. This
is a possible explanation of the fall after rise of DAG(Q).
Therefore, we can learn that more adversarial knowledge does
not always bring more de-anonymization gain. Some may
question why few data points are plotted in the figures. This
is because pq is determined by mQ, and the algorithm we use
does not support querying dense graphs.
C. Implications
Medium-density queries are more powerful: Graph au-
tomorphism makes it harder to tell individual nodes apart and
exactly de-anonymize them, even when the attacker finds the
right subgraph in G corresponding to Q. An ego network has
the most number of automorphisms when it is either very
sparse (close to a star) or very dense (close to a clique). As
revealed in Fig. 9(c) and 9(d), the de-anonymization gain first
increases to the peak and then gradually drops again. Namely,
de-anonymizing adversarial graphs of medium density might
be the easiest. By the cask effect, the data protector can design
perturbation methods to lower the peak so as to improve the
overall data privacy.
Attack-resistance of data: No matter if there is a transition
phenomenon, the vanish point reflects the attack-resistance
property of the published graph G, since it is the point with the
worst user identity leak (the target users are all successfully
de-anonymized). A greater vanish point implies that G is
more resistant to de-anonymization attacks, that is, the attacker
needs to collect more background knowledge to recover users’
identities. The position of the vanish point is up to the
properties of G itself and the parameter assumptions about
Q (recall Section IV-D). An implication for data publishers is
that changing G’s properties during data perturbation to defer
the vanish point may also help reduce the risk of privacy leak.
Break knowledge and attack better: The difficulty of de-
anonymization is two-fold: the computational complexity of
subgraph matching and the indistinguishability of the matches.
In the settings with a transition phenomenon, the attacker
might achieve better attacker results, i.e. pinpoint users with
a higher probability, if she breaks down her background
knowledge graph into several smaller graphs and finds their
matches separately. For example, when nQ is around the peak
point, this strategy might make the de-anonymization more
efficient and accurate. However, the attacker should not reduce
her knowledge when nQ is near the vanish point, or she
would achieve worse attack result. Though the effectiveness
of the strategy still needs verifying, our work might help the
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Fig. 9: The impact of nQ and pq on DAG(Q) for non-star queries on synthetic and real networks: DAG(Q) decreases
with growing nQ. When pq increases, DAG(Q) first rises and then falls off a bit.
attacker to make better use of the background knowledge for
de-anonymization attack. The question when and how to break
the knowledge is saved for our future work.
VII. DISCUSSION
More complex de-anonymization gain definitions: Some-
times user identity privacy is disclosed when the attacker
knows that a user belongs to a community (such as a drug
rehabilitation or disease treatment group), even though the user
is not exactly de-anonymized at the individual level. We refer
to it as community level de-anonymization. Since the mapping
between Q and I does not matter, the number of matched
communities CQ (defined as follows) is more relevant than
MQ to privacy measure.
Definition 6 (Matched Community): Given G and Q, a
matched community is a subset Vs ⊆ V s.t. there is a bijective
mapping f : VQ → Vs that satisfies
∀e(u, v) ∈ EQ, e( f (u), f (v)) ∈ E .
There is no exact relation between CQ and MQ, but CQ can
be counted by checking the nodes of every match in MQ,
which relies on solving the NP-complete subgraph matching
enumeration problem.
`-Indistinguishability: We can define `-Indistinguishability
to measure the privacy of the published graph G, which is
similar to k-anonymity [16]. Suppose ` = MQ matches are
found by querying G with Q, we say G satisfies weak `-
indistinguishability under the attack of Q. However, there
might be overlapped nodes in the ` matches [8]. To overcome
this weakness, we can construct a new query graph Q′ which
consists of ` disjoint copies of Q, and use Q′ to query G. If
M ′Q ≥ 1, then we say strong `-indistinguishability is achieved.
VIII. RELATED WORKS
A. Social Network Anonymization and De-Anonymization
The fight between de-anonymization and anonymization is
becoming more and more fierce. Some researches aim at
attacking/protecting an individual’s privacy on the basis of
k-anonymity [16]. For example, k-neighborhood anonymity
[10], [11] was proposed to protect against 1-neighborhood
attack and 1∗-neighborhood attack, and k2-degree anonymity
[26] is proposed to defend against friendship attack, where
the attacker is assume to know the degrees of two users
who are friends. Some methods add great perturbations to
the published graph to achieve k-candidate anonymity [12],
k-automorphism [9], or k-isomorphism [8], yet cause the loss
of data utility/quality.
Other related works focus on graph mapping attacks, also
referred to as structure-based de-anonymization, in which the
attacker de-anonymize users by mapping one network he
possesses to the published network. Most of these attacks
are seed-based, including [4], [5], [7]. Here seed users refer
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to outstanding users, such as users with very high degrees
like celebrities. There are also works that do not need seed
users, e.g. [6], [21], [27], which are based on Bayesian model,
optimization and knowledge graph model respectively. As
shown by [6], most existing social network datasets are de-
anonymizable partially or completely, and there is no effective
countermeasure proposed yet.
B. Subgraph Matching/Isomorphism
As aforementioned, the subgraph matching problem is NP-
complete [15]. However, it has a wide variety of applications
including biological networks [28], knowledge bases [29], and
program analysis [30].
A widely accepted approximation in subgraph matching
is to perform prune-and-search by indexing the graph data.
Such approaches can be classified based on how indexing
is performed: edge index [31], frequent subgraph index [32],
and neighborhood index [33]. To our knowledge, the STwig
deployed on Trinity Memory Cloud [34] are the most efficient;
the run time is several seconds when a graph with tens of nodes
and edges is queried in a graph of size 1 billion.
Extended from subgraph matching, the subgraph counting
problem is more related to our paper but even harder to solve.
Most of existing algorithms can only estimate the count when
the subgraph has a small size or a particular structure like
tree, cycle or triangle [23], [25]. Slota et al. [23] applied
the color coding technique [35] to approximately count non-
induced occurrences of tree subgraphs, yet the algorithm can
only count for subgraphs with at most 12 nodes. A state of
the art approximate subgraph counting algorithm was proposed
by [25] in 2016, which can efficiently find matches for query
graphs with treewidth no more than 2.
IX. CONCLUSION
This work presents a comprehensive analysis on the impact
of the attacker’s background knowledge on de-anonymization
gain for social network de-anonymization. First of all, we
elaborately categorize background knowledge in multiple di-
mensions in terms of its properties, and analyze how the
type of background knowledge influences the definition of
“matching” and thus the result of de-anonymization. We
quantify background knowledge by both quantity and quality
and introduce a definition for de-anonymization gain. Then
we present a detailed theoretical analysis on the relation be-
tween background knowledge and de-anonymization gain for
network data of two popular data models (G(n, p) and power-
law), which reveals that in some settings de-anonymization
gain is not necessarily monotone increasing with the amount
of background knowledge. Despite the hardness of subgraph
counting, we conduct simulations on both synthetic and real
networks, which further verifies our claim and leaves implica-
tions for the data protector and the attacker.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: The idea behind this formula is similar to ex-
haustive search. As shown in Fig. 1, the number of possible
candidates like I is
( n
nQ
)
nQ!. Since G is a random graph, we
can compute the probability of Q and I being a match (defined
later) and then use it to estimate MQ, and further estimate
DAG(Q). The exponential bounds for the upper and lower
tails of the distribution of MQ were discussed in [36], [37].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: In Chung-Lu model [14], given n nodes and a
degree sequence (d1, d2, . . . , dn), an edge is added between
any two nodes u and v with the probability pu,v =
dudv∑
k≤n dk
. It
is assumed that max{d2
k
} ≤ ∑k≤n dk [14]. Besides, the relation
of n and α, β is
n =
∞∑
d=1
n(d) =
∞∑
d=1
αd−β =
α
β − 1 . (14)
For the case of exact and partial knowledge with attribute ig-
nored, the expected number of matches yielded from querying
G with Q can be computed as follows. Let I be any induced
subgraph of size nQ of G with the nodes mapped to nodes in
Q, e.g., u′, v′ in I correspond to u, v in Q.
MQ =E(
∑
I
∏
(u,v)∈EQ
pu′,v′)
=E(
∑
I
∏
(u,v)∈EQ
du′dv′∑
k≤n dk
)
=
1
(∑k≤n dk)mQ ∑I E( ∏(u,v)∈EQ du′dv′)
(15)
For any two edges (u′1, v′1), (u′2, v′2) in I, they might be adja-
cent, e.g. u′1 = u
′
2. So du′1dv′1 and du′2dv′2 are either independent
or positively correlated. Thus we have cov(du′1dv′1, du′2dv′2 ) ≥ 0,
and then
E(du′1dv′1 · du′2dv′2 )
=cov(du′1dv′1, du′2dv′2 ) + E(du′1dv′1 )E(du′2dv′2 )
≥E(du′1dv′1 )E(du′2dv′2 )
=E(du′1 )E(dv′1 )E(du′2 )E(dv′2 )
=d¯4,
(16)
where d¯ is the average degree. Likewise, we have
E(
∏
(u,v)∈EQ
du′dv′) ≥ d¯2mQ . (17)
The sum of degrees in G is∑
k≤n
dk =
∞∑
d=1
αd−β · d
=α
∞∑
d=1
d1−β
=
α
β − 2
(18)
so the average degree is
d¯ =
1
n
∑
k≤n
dk =
α
(β − 2)n . (19)
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By Equation (15), we have
MQ ≥( β − 2
α
)mQ
∑
I
d2mQ
≥( β − 2
α
)mQ
∑
I
( α(β − 2)n )
2mQ
=( β − 2
α
)mQ ·
(
n
nQ
)
nQ!( α(β − 2)n )
2mQ
=
(
n
nQ
)
nQ!( α(β − 2)n2 )
mQ .
(20)
We will obtain the lower bound after substituting α with n, β
by equation 14.
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